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itizens of the United States are 
beginning to realize that economic 
prosperity also brings about political 
success. The support of top corporate 
elites has become one of the main deciding 
factors in political elections. As politicians also 
become aware of this fact, their focus tends to 
gravitate toward the interests of the small 
wealthy population, leaving the majority of their 
constituents behind. This trend essentially 
establishes a gap based on the preferences 
between the rich and the poor. With this said, 
the American government plays a large role in 
the causes of income inequality. Consequently, 
political institutions have begun to show 
unequal responsiveness between high and low 
income citizens. Those with low incomes are 
underrepresented in American institutions, 
which results in a preference gap between the 
rich and the poor.  The greater income 
inequality present, the greater the preference gap 
will be. These trends have resulted in an 
overwhelming amount of unfair policy choices 
in American political institutions.  
 In this paper, I will explore income 
inequality in America as it is presently. I will 
begin by examining what causes inequality and 
further my analysis through examining the 
implications it has on political institutions’ 
responsiveness, and representation. I will 
observe the differing policies in which the rich 
and poor favor, and examine government 
responsiveness state-by-state. Through this, I 
will research whether the poor are properly 
represented in American institutions. In 
addition, I will discuss the important role racial 
inequality plays in economic inequality and 
show how one is embedded in the other.  There 
is an apparent preference gap in American 
politics, which can be seen as a direct product of 
the income gap. Political parties and institutions 
appeal toward specific income groups – 
primarily the affluent. 
 
INCOME INEQUALITY AND UNEQUAL 
POWER 
Income inequality plays a large role in the course 
of American politics. In “Winner-Take-All 
Politics,” authors Jacob Hacker and Paul Pierson 
discuss the issues of the extreme concentration 
of income gains at the top of the economic 
ladder. They acknowledge the role of 
government policy in creating a “winner-take-
all” pattern and explore the long-term 
transformation of the organizational landscape 
of American politics (Hacker & Pierson 2010). 
They examine that the balance of political power 
is sharply in favor of the extreme wealthy, 
paving the way for America’s winner-take-all 
inequality. Due to this extreme bias, public 
policy and institutional representation tends to 
lean in favor of those with high incomes. 
 The dramatic rise of income inequality was 
not initially debated in the realm of politics. 
Until recently, most of the discussion focused on 
the hypothesized economic roots of rising 
inequality. However, much of the research’s 
criticism derived from the absence of the 
relationship of inequality in American politics. 
(Hacker & Pierson 2010). In the past few years, 
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there have been multitudes of books and articles 
written by prominent political scientists who 
have begun to research the importance of this 
phenomenon. Their central theses are based on 
the fact that politics and public policy have 
played a pertinent role in the rise of inequality, 
much more than what economic accounts 
suggest (Hacker & Pierson 2010). Now, both 
public officials and institutions are critical 
factors to examine in order to understand the 
calamities of income inequality.  
 Hacker and Pierson believe that a 
“convincing political analysis” of income 
inequality must contain two essential parts. First 
is staying consistent with the fact that American 
inequality is “winner-take-all,” which means that 
a small slice of the population is becoming 
dramatically richer while the majority of the 
population remains stagnant. Second, the 
analysis must show the relationship between the 
economic factors that set inequality and the 
outcomes of public policy in American politics 
(Hacker & Pierson 2010). Their research tackles 
both of these areas and hinges off the fact that 
although gaps have grown across the income 
spectrum, the real action is at the top, especially 
the very top. The top 0.01 – 1 percent of the 
United States population income, which is about 
the richest 150,000 or so families, are growing 
quicker than the rest of the population (Hacker 
& Pierson 2010). They further their hypothesis 
by arguing that winner-take-all inequality 
constitutes from public policies that have 
enhanced economic rewards only for those at 
the top of the economic ladder. This requires 
looking closely at various mechanisms in which 
organized interests attempt to influence 
authority for personal needs.  
Income inequality could be measured in 
several ways. In Hacker and Pierson’s study on 
Winner-Take- All Politics, they base their 
statistics on pretax income earned in order to 
rate levels on inequality (Hacker & Pierson 
2010). However, in this case, the use of the Gini 
index would work best in order to determine the 
relationship between income and shares in the 
population. The Gini index specifically 
“measures the extent to which the distribution of 
income among individuals or households within 
an economy deviates from a perfectly equal 
distribution” (World Bank 2016). This index 
ranges from values of zero, indicating perfect 
equality, to one, implying perfect inequality.  
Therefore, if the Gini index coefficient is greater, 
the more concentrated the nation’s wealth will 
be toward the top.  
According to data retrieved from 2012 from 
the Organization for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD), the United States 
has a Gini coefficient of 0.390, which ranks them 
29th compared to 30 other developed countries 
only placing ahead of Turkey and Mexico. In 
order to understand how this coefficient affects 
inequality, one must examine the Gini index 
before and after taxes and transfers (OECD 
2016). This research is not intended to go into 
an in depth analysis of taxes and transfers 
however, it important to see where the United 
States stands in regards to the Gini Index.   
 Like any study, it is important to understand 
why this topic matters. While this is an evident 
problem in the United States now more than any 
other country in the world, understanding why 
this trend should be fixed is crucial. To start, 
more Americans are continuing to see greater 
divergence in the standards of living between the 
middle-class, poor, and wealthy. As one may 
assume, people in the lowest-income group 
“express less financial satisfaction now than at 
any time in the last 25 years” (Pew 2012). 
However, one must examine why the poor are 
poor. Forty-six percent of a population say that 
the reason they are poor are due to 
circumstances beyond one’s control (Pew 2012). 
Although a majority of Americans believe that 
hard work pays off in economic success, there is 
no doubt that people simply become 
discouraged due to their lack of belief in social 
mobility, or ability to move within a social 
hierarchy (“social mobility”).  In a different 
study conducted by OECD, they found a 
correlation between high inequality and lower 
social mobility rates. Therefore, countries with 
lower Gini indexes such as Denmark, Germany, 
and Finland will have greater social mobility, 
whereas the United States will have less due to 
their high rates of wealth inequality (OECD 
2014).  
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 Along these same lines, inequality can also 
have an effect on education. This comes to show 
that this trend is not only an economic issue, but 
a social one as well. A highly skewed distribution 
of wealthy can be lethal to an overall growth of 
society, especially if it means unequal 
opportunity for new generations to come 
(Hacker & Pierson 2010). This affect will not 
only continue the movement of inequality in the 
future, it will lead these social classes to become 
more polarized than they already are. Hacker 
and Pierson also address the issue that the 
educated elite is not the same as the economic 
elite. Those at the top are often highly educated, 
but so too are those below them on the 
economic ladder who have been left behind. 
Only a small portion of the educated elite has 
entered the new economic elite (Hacker & 
Pierson 2010).  
 Subsequently, the shift of income toward the 
top has been increasing steadily since around 
1980. The gap between the wealthy and poor is 
now the highest since the 1940s. This is due to 
the matter that gains at the very top were not 
accompanied by significant gains for those at the 
bottom of the income ladder (Hacker & Pierson 
2010). Based on the Congressional Budget Office 
(CBO), there is few “trickle down” benefits for 
most of the population. These gains have been 
sustained, and growing steadily without 
interruption since. Hacker and Pierson make an 
important note that the growing share of 
national income captured by the richest 
Americans is not related to either the business 
cycle or the shifting occupation of the White 
House (Hacker & Pierson 2010). Therefore, this 
entails that the causes and solutions could be 
found in other areas such as public policy.  
  Larry Bartels’ Unequal Democracy explains 
how the widening gap between the rich and the 
poor resulted in unfair policy choices in the 
political system. Hacker and Pierson agree with 
Bartels’ notion that because the wealthy are able 
to contribute to the political system, citizens of 
higher incomes see more policy initiatives in 
their favor (Bartels 2008). However, they 
criticize Bartels failure to include the incomes of 
the top 1% in his research. Hacker and Pierson’s 
research hinges off the fact that the 1% of the 
wealthiest people make more money that the rest 
of the population combined (Hacker & Pierson 
2010). They believe that leaving out this vital 
information is essential to completely 
understanding how income inequality has direct 
consequences on unfair public policy and 
representation in the American political system.  
 In public policy, citizens envision their 
government to act on behalf of society as a whole 
by weighing the interests of both the rich and the 
poor equally. The problems that income 
inequality poses on the fairness of the political 
system directly affects the nature of its 
democracy (Bartels 2008). The United States was 
built upon the framework of core democratic 
values that unite all Americans despite where 
one stands financially. It provides each citizen 
with equal rights such as life, liberty, and the 
pursuit of happiness. If citizens at the top of the 
income ladder are able to have a greater say in 
the political scene than those at the bottom, is 
the U.S. able to maintain the fairness of its 
democracy? Political scientists such as Bartels 
and Martin Gilens ask this question in order to 
understand the political implications of income 
inequality. 
Similar to Hacker and Pierson, Bartels 
acknowledges that the deep issue of income 
disparity in the United States is not simply an 
economic one, but “in substantial part, a 
political phenomenon” (Bartels 2008). To back 
up this claim, he examines the income trends 
between the rich and the poor from President 
Truman’s administration to President George 
W. Bush. Bartels focuses on how Democrats and 
Republicans either cause or effect the rise of 
inequality in America through policy trends. He 
concludes by showing how inequality 
historically rises under Republican 
administrations, and under Democratic 
presidents, “poor families did slightly better than 
richer families” (Bartels 2008). He specifically 
notes that under Presidents Eisenhower, Nixon, 
Ford, Reagan, and both Bushes, the income gap 
increased, while it declined under all the 
Democratic presidents except Jimmy Carter. 
Both Hacker and Pierson agree with Bartels that 
this was “not a mere coincidence in the timing of 
Democratic and Republican presidents.” Instead, 
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this shows how the “two parties pursue different 
economic agendas, while appealing to two 
separate income groups” (Bartels 2008). 
 Historically, Democrats focus on policies 
such as lowering unemployment and output 
growth, while also looking to raise social 
expenditures. These trends undoubtedly and 
disproportionately benefit poor and middle-class 
families over wealthier ones (Balz 2008). On the 
other hand, Republican administrations look 
toward amending fiscal policies such as 
containing inflation rates and tax policy. One 
can immediately point out that these policies are 
insignificant to those with lower incomes. 
Bartels notes that the Republicans’ fiscal policies 
have inconsequential effects on real income 
growth for those citizens near the bottom of the 
income distribution but “substantial effects at 
the top” (Balz 2008). In regards to tax policy, 
Republicans have historically been more 
inclined to push for tax cuts that would support 
the wealthy, while exploiting the majority of the 
tax-paying population.  
 While Republicans undoubtedly receive its 
main support from its wealthy constituents, it is 
important to question why Republicans also 
receive a substantial amount of support from 
white lower- to middle- class citizens as well. 
Bartels makes a strong approximation by stating 
that, “the net decline in Democratic 
identification among poor whites over the past 
half-century is entirely attributable to the demise 
of the Solid South as a Democratic allegiance” 
(Bartels 2008). Since 1952, the South’s 
Democratic identification went from 46 percent 
to negative 6 percent in 2004. As a result of this 
data, is it safe to assume that working-class 
whites have become more conservative in their 
politics? Bartels brings up an interesting point as 
to one reason why this trend is occurring. 
Republicans have succeeded in shifting the focus 
of political debates from economic issues, where 
low-income voters are generally relatively 
liberal, to cultural issues, where they are 
generally relatively conservative (Bartels 2008). 
More politicians are finding ways to downplay 
the politics of economic for reelection and 
favorability purposes, which finds that culture 
seems to outweigh economic as a principle 
public concern. Bartels states that due to these 
conservative culture preferences, the white 
working-class have reluctantly accepted the 
Republican economic agenda as “part of the 
package” (Bartels 2008).  
 In a recent article written by Jacob Hacker 
and Paul Pierson, they predict the effects that the 
Trump administration’s tax cuts will have on 
income inequality.  As previously mentioned, 
there is an evident red-state vs. blue-state bias in 
politics. As a result, parties generally try to favor 
segments of society that will support them 
(Hacker & Pierson 2017). As briefly noted 
earlier, Republican economic agenda usually 
revolves around tax cuts for the wealthy; 
however, this does not equate to Republicans 
redistributing its wealth back to states that 
support it. Republicans’ bias toward big business 
and rich donors fit the exact policy patterns in 
which they support. However, the issue with 
Trump’s administration is that those who are the 
main beneficiaries of the Republican tax bill no 
longer reside in the prevalent in red states. 
Instead, this deep party divide and new spoils 
system does not just corrupt our policies, but 
“cripple the economic future” of the United 
States (Hacker & Pierson 2017).  
 In order to support this claim, in his work, 
Bartels examines the election of 2000 between 
George W. Bush and Al Gore. Income inequality 
trends show that the top 5 percent of the 
wealthiest families saw an increase in real 
income during President Bush’s first four years 
as president. Consequently, middle and low-
income families saw a decline of 3 percent in real 
income (Bartels 2008). Interestingly, Bartels then 
uses a hypothetical example to show what it 
would be like if Al Gore had been elected in 
2000. Based on historical data, he found that the 
middle and low-income citizens would have 
seen an increase of 6 percent, while the wealthy 
would have remained stagnant with essentially 
no gain (Balz 2008). Bartels shows how the 
differing economic agendas of the two parties 
ultimately signals the rise of the preference gap 
in American politics.   
It has become apparent that most policy 
initiatives that affect the majority of the people 
are driven by the political power of the wealthy. 
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Those at the top of the income bracket are able 
to have a significant amount of political 
influence through campaign financing and other 
forms of donations. Top corporate elites, such as 
CEOs and hedge fund managers, are typically 
supporting bills or policies that benefit their 
personal needs rather than society as a whole. As 
a result of this, policy and legislation coming out 
of Congress is usually skewed in favor toward 
the top producers of income.  These private 
troubles warrant significant public issues due to 
the fact that public policy is no longer created 
for the greater majority of Americans, but 
instead for specific groups in the population 
(Bartels 2008). 
There are various reasons as to why 
politicians may seek the agendas of the wealthy 
before those of lower incomes. As mentioned 
briefly earlier, campaign financing and the 
influence of money plays a large role in the 
fulfillment of political agendas. Politicians aim 
to fulfill the policies of those who are able to 
contribute to their campaigns. While they may 
support different policy preferences, both 
conservatives and liberals are culprits of extreme 
campaign finance.  The 2016 election saw the 
most expensive campaign season in history as 
spending to influence the presidential and 
congressional elections led to almost $10 billion 
(Price 2017). Political action committees, also 
known as super PACs, can raise and spend 
unlimited amounts of money supplied largely by 
corporations, unions, associations, and wealthy 
individuals and have reported $707 million 
raised for the 2016 presidential race alone (Price 
2017).   
Campaign finance regulations have recently 
been lifted through various Supreme Court 
cases, which has led to several unfair policy 
choices coming out of Congress. “Although 
there are large amounts of literature, which 
examine the effects of campaign finance 
regulation on the behavior of political 
campaigns, there are not enough [studies] that 
show the potential effects of regulations on 
political and policy outcomes” (Flavin 2015). 
Patrick Flavin concludes by assessing that 
regulations on campaign financing are one of 
the most visible ways in which the federal and 
state governments can level out the “political 
playing field” between the rich and the poor 
(Flavin 2015).   
As political scientist Benjamin Page 
examines the policy preferences and the role of 
the wealthy in American politics, it comes to no 
surprise that wealthy Americans tend to be 
highly active than the typical citizen. Page agrees 
with Flavin that financial contributions serve as 
a catalyst by which Americans obtain a 
disproportionate amount of political power.  Not 
only are they well-informed with current 
political issues, Page finds that 99 percent of his 
survey’s respondents voted in the 2008 election 
while 41 percent said to have attended a 
campaign speech or meeting (Page 2013). 
Interestingly enough, 68 percent of the survey’s 
respondents stated that they directly contributed 
money to politics and 21 percent helped solicit 
or bundle contribution.  The author does not 
seem shocked by this phenomenon. He states, it 
is “little wonder that those who have the most 
money give the most to politics” (Page 2013). 
They get the most out of it as well.  
Another reason why politicians may seek 
out preferences of the affluent over the poor is 
due to their overall disconnect with the public. 
Patrick Fisher points out that although lower-
income citizens have differing policy preferences 
from higher-income citizens, those with lower-
incomes “have been historically 
underrepresented in policymaking institutions” 
(Fisher 2010). Fisher hypothesizes that one of 
the main causes of the disconnect between 
members of Congress and their constituents is 
due to the “wealth gap” and the mere fact that 
“members themselves are disproportionately 
wealthy” (Fisher 2016). This study shows that 
because Congress consists of mostly wealthy 
individuals, wealthier citizens are “modestly but 
significantly better reflected in choices than of 
their poorer counterparts.”  Although he focuses 
on the representational nature of Congress itself 
from the wealth perspective, he addresses that 
the disproportionate representation of race is 
also a factor to consider when examining policy 
preferences. I will examine this point further in a 
later part of this paper.  
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Along the same lines, Benjamin Page 
discusses another finding consistent to the 
pattern previously mentioned. He states that 
another possible mechanism for influence 
involves “access” to, or contacts with, public 
officials (Page 2013). Since the wealthy mainly 
associate with other wealthy individuals, it 
comes to no surprise that many donors have 
personal relations with their policymakers. 
When asked whether one had initiated a 
contract with several types of federal 
government official or their staffs, Page’s survey 
reveals that about half of its respondents 
reported contacted to at least one type of official. 
More specifically, the survey showed that 47 
percent of the respondents made at least one 
contact with a congressional office. Although 
less frequent, contact with White House officials 
and executive agencies were also common 
among interviewees. The authors note that this 
is a much higher proportion than what the 
general public has reported (Page 2013).  
 
PREFERENCE GAP: HOW DOES THE 
GOVERNMENT RESPOND? 
To start, one should note that the “preference 
gap” is different from the more commonly 
known “income gap.”  In his book, which studies 
the various aspects of “gapology,” Patrick Fisher 
defines the income gap as the “difference in the 
political behavior of those with low income and 
those with high income” (Fisher 2014). On the 
other hand, the preference gap as Martin Gilens 
examines, is the difference in the relationship 
between government policy and the preferences 
of high-income as opposed to low-income 
(Gilens 2009). According to data by the 
aforementioned political scientists, it seems as if 
the preference gap is a byproduct of the income 
gap. When exploring the preferences of 
Americans in different income groups, Gilens 
has similar data and techniques as Larry Bartels. 
They find that the more privileged subgroups of 
Americans have greater sway over government 
policy and are far better represented than the 
poor are. These preference gaps can be seen in a 
wide range of issues such as taxes, trade policy, 
or unemployment benefits, as well as non-
economic polices such as abortion, gay rights, 
and civil liberties (Gilens 2009).  
Before examining the public’s policy 
preferences, one should question how public 
preference data is collected and what types of 
preferences it consists of. Gilens notes that one 
of the difficulties in assessing public preferences 
is trying to identify a “suitable collection” to 
assess properly. In addition to this, the 
researcher must examine both a possible and 
existing policies to form proper assessment of 
preferences to ascertain what could and could 
not be (Gilens 2009). In his research, Gilens 
focuses on the net preference gaps between high 
and low income earners to establish inequalities 
in government responsiveness. By using a 
specific set of policy questions to represent the 
range of federal government policies, he is able 
to get a more accurate estimate on an average 
preference gap between low- and high- income 
Americans. Through the policy items observed, 
including welfare items, Gilens finds that there is 
a 17.8 percent preference gap. With risk of being 
an outlier, welfare policies were detracted from a 
first sample because of the stark difference of 
preferences among income earners. In addition, 
there are certain aspects in public policy such as 
abortion, creationism, and stem cell research, 
which inevitably all generate large preference 
gaps between high- and low- income Americans 
(Gilens 2009). Similar to welfare policy, the size 
of the preference gap will vary from one specific 
policy aspect to another. Gilens assesses his data 
by concluding that public policy in the United 
States would “look rather different if poor 
Americans had the influence over government 
policy that affluent Americans appear to enjoy 
(Gilens 2009).  
This study is continued in his work, 
Affluence and Influence, where Martin Gilens 
essentially agrees with Bartels’ theory of an 
“Unequal Democracy” in the United States. In 
fact, he researches how political inequality 
directly relates to economic inequality (Gilens 
2012). Similar to Hacker and Pierson, Gilens 
believes that there are various components, 
which have shaped the last several decades of 
disparity.  In winner-take-all politics, the role of 
organized interests and business groups has a 
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significant impact on the systemic rise of income 
inequality (Hacker & Pierson 2010). Those with 
personal interests or ties in a certain industry 
have influence over many politicians’ agendas, 
which in return leads to unfair policy initiatives. 
Gilens believes that interest groups, parties and 
elections also negatively contribute to this trend 
of inequality. As a result, politicians and 
institutions do not appropriately respond to the 
needs of all its citizens forming a preference gap 
in American politics (Gilens 2012). In his work, 
he finds it imperative to look at the policy 
preferences in which the rich and poor disagree 
rather than those in which they agree.  
One common trend found when researching 
the preference gap is that regardless of the 
consistency of policies preference between the 
rich and the poor, “when preferences between 
the well-off and the poor diverge, government 
policy bears absolutely no relationship to the 
degree of support of opposition among the 
poor” (Gilens 2012). In other words, when the 
policy preferences of the rich differentiate from 
that of the poor, the government will inevitably 
respond in support of the higher income group. 
It is only in social welfare policies that slight 
influence is seen by lower incomes due to the 
support from powerful interest groups. Despite 
this, interest groups do not seem to limit the 
power of affluent policy decisions (Gilens 2012).  
Furthermore, Gilens examines the 
preference gap during presidential election years 
versus non-election years. To no surprise, he 
notes that presidential elections increase 
government responsiveness in general, but 
primarily for the poor and middle class. In 
regards to the middle class, Gilens findings also 
show that policymaking is responsive to the 
higher-income groups, but not the middle-
income group. In non-election years, he sees the 
responsiveness divert back toward the wealthy 
(Gilens 2012). Lastly, he explains how parties 
have also negatively affected government 
responsiveness toward lower income citizens. As 
discussed earlier, it comes as no surprise that 
those who contribute to candidates’ campaigns 
have a stronger say in directing policies in 
general. However, Gilens finds that regardless of 
one’s affluent status, policy influence decreases 
based on the majority party in office. As 
previously mentioned, political parties have clear 
preferences and appeal toward specific income 
groups.  
 This hypothesis is further heightened by 
specifically exploring state political parties and 
representation of the poor. Authors Elizabeth 
Rigby and Gerald Wright research how the poor 
is affected by income inequality and the 
repercussions it has on the preference gap. They 
conclude that in terms of political parties and 
the policymaking process, low-income citizens 
are ignored regardless of party affiliation (Rigby 
& Wright 2013). For example, Democratic 
parties and Republican parties vary by appealing 
toward specific income groups. Democratic 
parties capitalize on the relative liberalism of the 
wealthy on social issues, and Republican parties 
benefit from the relative conservativism of the 
wealthy on economic issues. In addition, Rigby 
and Wright agree with Gilens and Bartels that 
income inequality has an extreme effect on 
responsiveness. “Where and when income 
inequality is higher, parties will exhibit greater 
differential responsiveness toward their income-
third constituents” (Rigby & Wright 2013). 
Similar to Hacker and Pierson, they find that the 
responsiveness to the affluent is most visible in 
states with greater income inequality – where 
economic resources are most concentrated in 
the hands of the few.  
 While most hope that political parties in the 
United States serve to link citizens with its 
political institutions in order to enhance 
representation of those with fewer resources, the 
current campaign environment seems to provide 
incentive to appeal wealthy citizens (Rigby & 
Wright 2013). The preferences of citizens with 
lower incomes are often kept out of political 
agendas and are likely to remain off through 
most legislative processes. Rigby and Wright 
examine how the poor is left out early on in the 
policymaking process by examining the 
preferences of low-income, middle- income, and 
high-income citizens. Due to the stark ideologies 
of the Democratic and Republican parties, the 
authors examine the parties’ stances on 
economic and social issues. They look at the 
relationship between each income group’s 
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preferences with their party positions and 
compare the results.  
They examine economic issues first. With 
Democratic parties, they found little alignment 
between party positions and the opinion of 
either low-income or middle-income citizens in 
the state. Instead, the results only showed 
alignment between higher income constituents 
(Rigby & Wright 2013). Contrarily, Republican 
parties’ economic positions are almost identical 
with higher income preferences. However, there 
is a different pattern for social policy issues. 
They find that both Democrats and Republicans 
show alignment among all three income groups 
when considered alone. To bring this data 
together, the authors “illustrate how, for 
economic policy issues, party positions are 
aligned with the preferences of the more 
advantaged constituents” (Rigby & Wright 
2013). However, for social issues, both parties 
align with each income group. Similar to Gilens’ 
findings, when social issues diverge between 
high and low income preferences, it is only the 
more advantaged constituents who remain to be 
influential to the policymaking process. 
Therefore, in terms of the poor, “preferences 
align only on social issues – and only when they 
overlap with the preferences of the middle – or 
high-income groups” of that same party (Rigby 
& Wight 2013).  
Lastly, in order for Rigby and Wright to 
show whether responsiveness to the wealthy is 
greater in states with more income inequality, 
they use a cross-sectional measure of income 
inequality based on market-income, pretax, and 
transfer family income. In addition, they use the 
Gini Coefficient in order to capture how far the 
state’s income distribution deviates from perfect 
equality. Their research finds that Democratic 
parties varied by the level of income disparity in 
the states, while Republican parties did not vary 
by income inequality for economic issues or for 
social issues (Rigby & Wright 2013). One reason 
for this may be that concerns about high 
economic inequality worsens government 
responsiveness in state Democratic parties. 
States with more equal distributions do not find 
differential responsiveness across the three 
income groups. Although, the Democratic party 
positions are highly skewed toward the rich in 
states with high amounts of income inequality 
(Rigby & Wright 2013).  
The authors analyze this trend by 
understanding patterns of resource constraints 
on parties. Unlike Bartels, Rigby and Wright 
believe that because Republicans inherently have 
a wealthier constituency base, they are able to 
readily contribute and fund the party’s needs. 
With this said, they feel as if Republicans have 
the economic flexibility to appeal to broader 
preferences of lower incomes. On the other 
hand, the authors feel as though Democratic 
parties are more economically constrained, and 
thus, feel pressured to appeal to the policy 
priorities of the wealthy (Rigby & Wright 2013).  
 As Rigby and Wright examine the 
preferences of poor Americans, Benjamin Page 
describes democracy and the policy preference 
of wealthy Americans. This article relates 
directly and agrees with both Gilens’ and Bartels’ 
works that there are significant preference gaps 
between the affluent and other Americans 
concerning both social and economic issues. In 
order to get the most accurate information, Page 
compared wealthy Americans’ responses to their 
survey with the responses that the public has 
given in various other polls. He finds that 
affluent citizens are unsupportive of job and 
income programs, raising the minimum wage, 
and unemployment. In addition, they are less 
willing to provide education opportunities. Most 
importantly, the surveys find that that the 
affluent are less willing to pay more in taxes to 
provide healthcare for everyone, favor a lower 
estate tax, and less eager to increase the income 
tax on high income people (Page 2013). Lastly, 
and the most pertinent to my research, the 
wealthy oppose government action to 
redistribute income or wealth in order address 
the issue of economic inequality.  
  Here, it is important to examine in detail 
the stark difference of policy preference and 
priorities of wealthy Americans from those of 
ordinary citizens. To start, it is interesting to 
point out that 87 percent of the Page’s survey 
respondents stated that budget deficits were the 
“most important” problem facing the United 
States. Only 4 percent felt that this was “not very 
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important at all” (Page 2013). Another point to 
emphasize is that the survey found that 84 
percent of respondents called unemployment 
and education “very important” problems, but 
was not considered the “most important” issue. 
In regards to social issues, climate change was 
regarded as “very important” by only 16 percent 
of the survey’s respondents (Page 2013).  
 Since most of the wealthy respondents 
focused on the issue of deficits, the authors 
analyzed how the wealthy confront this and 
other problems. There appears to be a disparity 
between the wealthy and other Americans 
regarding how to address specific issues such as 
the deficit. The focus on deficits is not a widely 
shared view by the majority of Americans. To 
deal with these kind of problems, the wealthy 
tend to favor spending cuts rather than tax 
increases (Page 2013).  These policy preferences 
tend to occur at the expense of the majority of 
middle and low-income Americans. In regards 
to the unemployment, high-income groups favor 
relying on private enterprises to amend the issue 
rather than governmental income maintenance 
(Page 2013). To address education, the wealthy 
find it more favorable to rely on market-based 
reforms while promote spending cuts for public 
schools and financial assistance. One of the stark 
economic difference among high and low-
income constituents is their disagreement on 
spending levels (Page 2013). Page also discusses 
differences among tax policies, education 
policies, healthcare issues, and economic 
regulations.  
 Since this paper discusses the relationship 
between income inequality and government 
responsiveness, it is important to consider how 
the wealthy regard the issues of income 
inequality itself. Page finds that the wealthy 
respondents are aware of the high levels of 
income inequality in the United States. 
Surprisingly, they also agreed at the fact that 
certain salaries should be adjusted in order to 
make wealth distribution more equal (Page 
2013). Despite this fact, the respondents did not 
agree to government regulations of the 
redistribution of wealth. Although they believe 
that incomes should be more equal, they 
evidently do not favor redistributive actions by 
the government. Page finds that 87 percent of 
the wealthy said that it is not the government’s 
responsibility to reduce income inequalities 
between the rich and the poor. Similarly, 83 
percent of the respondents stated that the 
government should not try to fix this problem by 
amending tax policies. These percentages can be 
compared to that of the general public’s opinion. 
Forty six percent of the majority of Americans 
stated that it is the government’s responsibility 
to alleviate income inequalities, while 52 percent 
also agree that it should be fixed by placing 
heavy taxes on the rich (Page 2013).  
 In contrast to the aforementioned authors, 
Stuart Soroka and Christopher Wlezien refute 
the hypothesis that public preferences across 
income brackets affect representation, 
responsiveness and democracy. Instead, they 
believe that the differences these in preferences 
are in fact small and insignificant. They find that 
differences are much greater across education 
levels and, especially, party identification 
(Soroka & Wlezien 2008). Rigby and Wright 
agree that party identification has a major role in 
political preferences, but they still deduce that 
income inequality is the main driving factor. 
Gilens disagrees with Soroka and Wlezien 
entirely and through a more accurate set of data 
and research questions proves that in terms of 
federal policy, the affluent are far better 
represented than poorer constituents are.  Flavin 
examines both Soroka and Wlezien with Gilens’ 
research and considers both of these arguments 
when he researches economic inequality on 
state-by-state basis.  
 Soroka and Wlezien refute the hypothesis 
stated in this paper. They agree that there are 
other factors or “sub-aggregates” that are based 
on income that affect overall government 
responsiveness. They discuss how education 
levels as well as party identification bears some 
of the burden when considering inequality in 
responsiveness. Because there are many different 
groups which representation could vary, Soroka 
and Wlezien believe that this empirical debate 
cannot be solely considered an income disparity 
issue. They indicate that income only really 
matters in cases that involve welfare spending 
(Soroka & Wlezien 2008). Other than that, 
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income levels in general play a small role in 
political responsiveness.  
 Soroka and Wlezien conduct their research 
by examining the U.S. General Social Survey 
(GSS) from 1973 to 2004. They pose questions 
about preference on government spending at all 
levels and opinions for policy changes. However, 
the questions posed in their survey are highly 
contested among other political scientists. Gilens 
analyzes over 1,700 different GSS survey 
questions that show the gap between low- and 
high-income Americans policy preferences. He 
deduces that the gap is much larger and extends 
much wider than what Soroka and Wlezien 
suggest from the GSS questions (Gilens 2009). 
He explains that the GSS data set on spending 
items is “too broad in nature”; whereas the 
question in Gilens’ data set tend to be more 
specific. If questions are too broad, it may 
“obscure the existing differences in policy 
preferences within policy domains” (Gilens 
2009).   
Therefore, Soroka and Wlezien do not 
accurately represent the size or distribution of 
the preference gap among high and low income 
constituents. It has been proven that preferences 
across income groups do differ by a significant 
amount on a variety of issues and therefore, 
Gilens concludes that the affluent have a 
significant amount of influence over 
government policy. If the rich and the poor were 
to switch roles in this case, it is clear that public 
policy would come to look much different in the 
United States (Gilens 2009).  
As already discussed, government 
representation is a key component of any 
democratic system. In a country like the United 
States, public opinion can vary greatly from state 
to state. Similar to many public issues, income 
inequality varies in almost every state or region. 
If income inequality and government 
responsiveness are linked, it is clear that 
government responses will vary from state to 
state as well.  Patrick Flavin examines income 
inequality and policy representation in each state 
to help better understand and explain Bartels 
concept of “unequal democracy”. (Flavin 2011).  
Like Gilens, Flavin agrees that income disparities 
are a driving factor when faced with equal 
representation. In addition, he pays attention to 
the question, “Are citizens’ opinions represented 
equally?” Like Bartels and Gilens, he agrees that 
the opinions of the poor are underrepresented in 
political institutions. He uses the differences in 
citizens’ opinions and public policies across the 
American states to examine whether state 
governments respond to their citizens as 
political equals – specifically citizens with low 
incomes (Flavin 2011). 
Flavin extends this research to each of the 
American states, which reveals similar results. In 
his findings, he uncovers that the opinions of 
citizens in the middle-and high-income groups 
are represented in state public policies, but the 
poor is still seen to be consistently 
underrepresented (Flavin 2011). In order for a 
democracy to function properly, constituents are 
to be considered as equals in the realm of 
politics; however, it is clear that the American 
system fall short of this imperative standard. 
Flavin heightens Bartels’ hypothesis in Unequal 
Democracy by showing that unequal 
representation also applies to the ideologies of 
state policies. In addition, this trend is also seen 
among social and economic issues across the 
United States.  Flavin concludes by mentioning 
that most studies of unequal representation fall 
short of explaining exactly “why these disparities 
occur” in the first place. He believes that in order 
to fully understand the causes of unequal 
political influences, studies should explain why it 
occurs to begin with (Flavin 2011).  
 
RACE AND INEQUALITY 
Lastly, it is important to consider race when 
describing any type of inequality. Rodney Hero 
and Morris Levy discuss the racial structure of 
economic inequality in the United States. 
Specifically, it examines the issues of income 
inequality in relation to race. The central 
question of the authors’ analysis asks how the 
structure of inequality by race has changed in an 
era of rapidly rising levels of income inequality 
(Hero & Levy 2016). News stories about income 
inequality often look past the issue of race 
despite the fact that economic disparities 
between racial groups plays a substantial role in 
its effects. The authors also mention Larry 
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Bartels work, Unequal Democracy and criticize 
that it does not mention or acknowledge the 
influence of race. They hypothesize that the 
sharp rise in income inequality in the United 
States since the 1970s cannot be viewed as a 
solely economic or “class” phenomenon: instead, 
racial inequality must also be embedded within 
rising income inequality (Hero & Levy 2016).   
This research compares racial structures and 
inequality between social classes. When 
considering race and income inequality there are 
two ways to characterize the differences. Hero 
and Levy discuss “within-group inequality” and 
“between-group inequality.” Within-group is the 
total income inequality between individual who 
are members of well-defined groups, such as 
whites or males. Between-group inequality is the 
total amount of inequality between individuals 
from various groups, such as between blacks and 
whites (Hero & Levy 2016). Not all income 
inequality can be considered the same. Although 
two different societies may obtain the same 
levels of income inequality, the authors show 
that it is necessary to note the biographical 
makeup of the population in order to 
understand the degree to which income 
differences between groups account for total 
inequality (Hero & Levy 2016).  
Hero and Levy conclude that race is key 
factor when examining inequality. With this 
said, it is important to note that income divides 
between racial groups accounted for a larger 
share of total inequality in 2010 than it did in 
1980, which shows that a “between-race” 
dimension of inequality has kept pace nationally 
(Hero & Levy 2016). Since racial inequalities 
have held firm with the rise of total income 
inequality at the national level, it is clear that this 
racial aspect is not just a simple byproduct of 
inequality, but a central component to it (Hero 
& Levy 2016).  
This racial component is furthered through 
Richard Harvey Brown’s “A Peculiar 
Democracy: Race, Class, and Corporate Power.”  
In this chapter of his book, he examines the 
recent trend in American inequality in politics. 
He notes that although the United States is the 
world’s third highest income per person, about 
19 percent of the population lives below the 
national poverty line (Brown 2005). In addition, 
he examines the historical exclusion of African 
Americans, which has led to the racial 
inequalities in both modernization and 
economics. Through Brown’s research he sees 
the creation of the black middle and professional 
classes and its expansion in recent decades, but 
continues to note that their conditions “of the 
lower strata have stagnated or declined 
compared to those of white Americans” (Brown 
2005). It is evident that income inequality must 
be viewed in a different perspective for blacks 
and other minorities than when examining it to 
the white population.  
 
CONCLUSION 
As proven throughout this paper, the political 
role of the wealthy has become a prominent 
concern for the democratic values of this 
country. Given the central importance of money 
in the various aspects of politics, it has become 
almost inevitable to maintain a proper 
democracy while giving equal political voice to 
all American citizens. This paper concludes that 
there is a direct link between income inequality 
and government responsiveness by politicians 
and institutions. Policy preferences of the poor 
are underrepresented in all aspects of American 
politics. There has been a consistent rise of 
income inequality, which is the growing gap 
between the rich and the poor. More specifically, 
the United States’ top 1 percent has consistently 
seen itself pull away from the rest, while the 
majority of the population remains stagnant.  
 Political scientists have characterized the 
United States as an “Unequal Democracy” as 
Larry Bartels put it, where the political system is 
piloted through unequal voices. Hacker and 
Pierson take it a step further and show how the 
American democracy has become an arena for 
“Winner-Take-All,” where the rich become 
richer. By examining the political preferences 
and attitude of both high- and low-income 
citizens, political scientists are able to better 
understand what causes the unequal 
responsiveness by the government. Whether 
there are sub-aggregate groups such as education 
and party affiliations that affect these outcomes, 
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the research has proven to show that income is 
at the base of inequality.  
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